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This paper explores the links between the patterns of migration (high vs. low-skill), trade policy, and 
foreign direct investment (FDI) from the standpoint of sending countries. A skeleton general equilibrium 
model with a non-traded good and sector-specific labour is used to explore the effects of the skill-
composition of exports on FDI. The model suggests that if exports are low-skill intensive, emigration of 
high- skill labour leads to positive FDI, suggesting that migration and FDI are complements. Cross-
sectional analysis using FDI and emigration data for 103 migration-sending countries over the period 
1990-2000 finds some support for this conjecture. 
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Globalization has become a major feature of the modern economic world. For many, the integration of 
goods and factor markets is believed to bring substantial gains to the countries opening their borders to 
trade, foreign capital, and migration, although labor markets are from being integrated.  In spite of the joint 
determination of migration, investment (FDI) and trade, the large and growing theoretical and empirical 
literatures on the migration-investment-trade nexus have not been analyzed in an integrated framework.  
We explore the links between FDI, trade and the composition of migration, considering all three jointly. 
Assuming that FDI responds to changes in the reward to capital, we investigate the effects of changes in 
the skill composition of the labour force through migration (emigration is assumed exogenous and 
determined by immigration policies in host countries) on FDI. If exports in migration sending countries are 
relatively less skill intensive than non-traded goods, a skewed pattern of emigration towards skilled labour 
which raises the price of the non-traded good will also raise the net capital reward, thereby leading to 
positive FDI. While non-traded sectors are usually assumed to be low-skill intensive, recent migration 
patterns suggest that this may not always be the case (e.g. the emigration of medical workers).  Similarly, 
if the elasticity of substitution between imported and non-traded good is less than 1, the reduction in trade 
costs will result in higher price of capital and positive FDI.  The effect of a reduction in trade costs on FDI 
works independently of the effects of the composition of emigration.  
Correlations on a sample of 103 developing countries using emigration rates by skill for 1990 and 2000 
from Docquier and Rapoport (2006) support the predictions of our theoretical framework. Over 1990-2000, 
the conditional correlation between FDI flows and the pattern of emigration suggests that an increase in 
the emigration rate of high-skilled workers (net of low-skilled emigration) by 10 percentage points is 
associated with an increase in annual FDI (as a share of GDP) of about 0.2 percentage points. The 
complementarity between skilled emigration and FDI is generally robust, notably to different measures of 
FDI and to different samples (i.e. excluding transition economies or small islands). It is also fairly robust to 
an alternative estimation on a smaller sample in which diaspora-related FDI has been purged.  We also 
find that average tariffs are negatively correlated with net FDI inflows. The inclusion or exclusion of the 
tariff variable does not affect the sign and significance of the coefficient of the migration variable.  Taken 
together, the results are supportive of studying the migration-trade-FDI nexus in a general equilibrium 
setting taking into account the skill composition of emigrants.  
 
  
1. Introduction  
 
Globalization has become a major feature of the modern economic world. For 
many, the integration of goods and factor markets is believed to bring substantial gains to 
the countries opening their borders to trade, foreign capital and migration, although labor 
markets are from being integrated. For example, the annual earnings premium for a 
Mexican worker in the US is around 17,500$ and multilateral negotiations on reducing 
barriers to labor mobility are not on the agenda.  According to received wisdom, one would 
expect that the combination of sharp reduction in trade costs and in policy-erected barriers 
to trade in goods would reduce migratory pressures as trade in goods would tend to close 
the wage gap across countries, in other words, one would expect that trade and migration 
are substitutes. Applying the same reasoning, one would expect that reductions in the 
barriers to investment, reflected in growing FDI, would also reduce migratory pressures, 
i.e. one would expect that FDI and migration are substitutes. Likewise, until recently trade 
and FDI were largely viewed as substitutes: high trade costs and policy-erected barriers to 
trade would be associated with an increase in what is now called horizontal or tariff-
jumping FDI.  
  In spite of the joint determination of migration, investment (FDI) and trade, the 
large and growing theoretical and empirical literatures on the migration-investment-trade 
nexus have not been analyzed in an integrated framework. Diaspora and human capital 
effects have been emphasized in the migration-FDI literature
1; the nature of FDI (vertical 
or horizontal) has been emphasized in the FDI-trade literature
2; and substitutability-
complementarity relations have been emphasized in the trade-migration literature
3. It 
                                                 
1 Cecchi, De Simone  and Faini (2007) question the virtuous circle between Human Capital (HC) and FDI 
proposed in the literature on the ‘brain gain’ initiated by Mountford (1997). Using data on skilled migration 
rates for 1990 and 2000, they find that tertiary enrolment is conditionally correlated positively with FDI 
(countries experiencing continuous FDI would then upgrade their skill content). However, at the same time 
the effect of this positive association on enrolments is eliminated by the negative correlation between tertiary 
school enrolment and emigration. Moreover, they obtain a negative conditional correlation between secondary 
enrolments and FDI. 
2 Recent models of trade and FDI distinguish between vertical FDI (VFDI) that takes advantage of differences 
in factor costs and tariff-jumping or horizontal FDI (HFDI) that seeks to avoid trade costs. With high trade 
costs, horizontal FDI  (HFDI) takes places, while with sufficiently different factor proportions between 
countries (and sufficiently low trade costs), vertical FDI (VFDI) will take place. In this framework developed 
by Markusen (2002) and Navaretti and Venables (2005), HFDI substitutes for trade and VFDI creates trade. 
Using macro data, Amiti and Wakelin (2003) find support for the predictions of these models. They find that 
investment liberalization among countries with similar factor endowments stimulates exports when trade costs 
are low whereas investment liberalization reduces trade for countries with similar size and endowments when 
trade costs are high.  
3 The literature on trade and migration has recently emphasized complementarities either because of credit 
constraints preventing the emigration of unskilled workers, or because of diaspora effects operating in the 
  1should not be surprising then that in a recent survey of the literature, Schiff (2007) 
concludes that what he calls the MIT (for migration, investment and trade) linkages are 
complex, making it difficult to draw suggestive policy recommendations for source or 
sending countries.   
  Recent data on the skill-composition of emigration for 1990 and 2000 compiled by 
Docquier and Marfouk (2006) shows that it is especially South-North migration of skilled 
labor that has increased and that for all but the large developing countries, skilled 
emigration is a sizeable fraction of the labor force  (Docquier (2007), Docquier, Lohest and 
Marfouk (2007)). Indeed, the availability of this data makes it possible to incorporate the 
skill-composition of emigration in the debate about the links between trade, migration and 
FDI and explore the channels through which emigration affects welfare in sending 
countries earlier identified in the ‘brain drain’ literature.
4  
This paper continues the exploration of the links between FDI, trade and the 
composition of migration, considering all three jointly. Section 2 sketches a Ricardo-Viner 
model of a price-taking economy with skilled and unskilled labor in which FDI flows 
respond to differences in rates of return and in which migration is considered exogenous 
reflecting barriers to immigration in receiving countries. This model provides a link 
between FDI, changes in trade costs, changes in the skilled-unskilled migration pattern of 
the sending country. The structural model serves to link patterns of FDI to a few structural 
characteristics (the labor market and trade structure) of the economy. Owing to a lack of 
data to confront the model’s predictions to the data directly, section 3 estimates the relation 
between FDI and the skill-composition of emigration for a sample of 103 sending countries 
over the period 1990-2000. Results are encouraging, suggesting that the skill-composition 
of emigration highlighted by the model matters for the pattern of FDI inflows. 
 
                                                                                                                                                     
literature on ethnic networks in international trade. However, most of the evidence is for the US. Evidence 
supportive of complementarities in bilateral trade between host and sending countries has been found for the 
US (Gould (1994), Head and Ries (1998), Rauch and Trinidade (2002) and Rauch and Casella (2003)). The 
role of diasporas has also been emphasized in several case studies on Information Technology between the US 
and India and between the US and Israel (Arora and Gambardella (2005)). Again, relying on US data, Kugler 
and Rapoport (2005, 2007) find that FDI in services are positively correlated with diaspora stocks indicating 
complementarities, whereas for manufactures unskilled diasporas and FDI are substitutes. Docquier and 
Lodigiani (2006) find evidence of positive externalities between skilled migration and FDI suggesting ‘brain 
gain’ effects associated with skilled migration.  
4 The ‘brain drain’ literature has been challenged on several fronts. Three channels have been identified to 
transform a ‘brain drain’ into a ‘brain gain’:(i) skilled migrants remit relatively large amounts; (ii) selective 
immigration policies in host countries may raise the attractiveness of migration for high-skilled individuals, 
which in turn raises the private returns to education via a reduced supply inducing  an additional investment in 
education in the host country; (iii) network effects may lead to technology transfer via FDI between host and 
sending countries 
  22. Migration, Trade and FDI: A Skeleton Model  
 
In view of the importance of migration in many sending countries, we develop a 
model that captures some of the economy-wide effects associated with emigration and the 
skill-composition of emigrants. Emigration is considered exogenous (subject to emigration 
policies in receiving countries), and capital is internationally mobile, responding to 
differences in the return to capital. Take then an economy producing two goods, non-
traded and exported  and to simplify, assume that all the production of the (  sector 
is exported. Three fully-employed factors are available in fixed amounts in the economy: 
two types of industry-specific labor,   (employed in the non-traded sector) and 
(employed in export sector), and capital 
() N () E ) E
N L
E L K .  Labor is internationally mobile 
(exogenously), but sector-specific while capital is intersectorally mobile within the 
economy with FDI responding to endogenously determined changes in the domestic return 
to capital.
 5
Constant returns to scale neoclassical production functions with a constant elasticity 
of substitution between factors describe the technology. Let  be the amount of 
specific factor  necessary to produce one unit of good of the non-traded (exported) 
good. The amount of capital (mobile factor) necessary to produce one unit of the non-traded 
(export) good is equal to 
( ) NN EE aa
( ) NE LL
( ) KNK E aa. Assume that all factors are fully employed. 
Following Jones (1971), total differentiation of the system describing the zero profit 
and full employment conditions, yields two expressions (see definition of variables below). 
The first links the rewards to capital, the mobile factor, to prices and endowments:  
 
  ( )
1 ˆˆ ˆ ˆˆ ; NN EE K NN K EE Rp p L L K ββ λ λ =+ + +− Δ
Δ
ˆ 0 >
                                                
 (1.1) 
Equation (1.1)  yields two familiar predictions from the Ricardo-Viner model. Emigration 
(i.e. a reduction in either type of labour) decreases the price of capital. Second, any increase 
in a goods price (i.e. a change in the relative price of goods) raises the rewards of the 




5 There is support for this hypothesis. For example, Friedberg (2001) finds a significant positive relationship 
between source and destination country sector employment for Russian immigrants to Israel in the nineties. 
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 (1.2) 
where   a  ‘^’ over a variable denotes the percentage change in that variable: 
  R  is the reward to the mobile factor; 
  ( ) , NE p p  are goods’ prices;  
     is factor’s i share in total income generated in sector () ,   , , ,   , ij N E iLLKjN E θ == j ; 
(   ,, Kj ) j NE λ = is the fraction of capital factor absorbed by the sector  j ;  















 is the elasticity of substitution between factors in sector j; 
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θ + = Ω . 
Expression (1.2)  links changes in outputs to changes in factor endowments, and to changes 
in prices, with the limiting case of no output responsiveness to price changes (a rectangular 
PPF) when the elasticities of factor substitution tend to zero 
.  () 00 EN if and σσ Ω→ → →0
Suppose momentarily that both goods are traded and the economy is small with 
fixed goods prices ( ) 0 ˆ ˆ = = D E p p . Then emigration of either type of labor will cause a 
decrease in the capital reward and a capital outflow or ‘negative’ FDI. Thus, if both goods 
produced were perfectly tradable as in most trade models, capital “follows” labor: 
migration and FDI are substitutes.  
To keep the model tractable we minimize the number of parameters by taking a 
representative consumer with a homothetic utility function consuming an imported good, 

























k  is a constant capturing expenditure shares and   and   are 
unit prices, and  σ is the elastiticity of substitution (i.e. the income-compensated price-
elasticity of demand).  
N p M p
  In this simple model, the revenue-equal-expenditure constraint implies balanced 
trade, i.e.:  
 
  M E M E π π =  (1.4) 
 
with the bar on the foreign-currency prices of traded goods reflecting the small-country 
assumption for traded goods.  Letting world prices equal to one by choice of units, in the 
absence of trade taxes, consumers and producers face world prices, i.e.  M M pe π = and 
EE p eπ =  where  converts foreign currency units to domestic currency units.  In the more 
general case, when there are barriers to trade (transport costs and/or trade taxes), the 
relative price guiding domestic decisions will be given by  
e
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and where  0 dφ <  captures the effects of a reduction in trade costs. Or, considering 
separately import and export costs (domestic consumers pay for imports more than  M π  and 














<     (1.5) 
and where   0 dμ <  captures the effects of a reduction in importing costs and  0 dε >  
captures the effects of a reduction in exporting costs.  The model is closed by choosing a 
numéraire, say the exchange rate. Then, the relative price of the non-traded good, or the real 
exchange rate,  , is the equilibrating variable.   1/ R
D e = p
Consider now the links between migration (assumed to be exogenous) and induced 
capital flows. To find the effect of migration on the reward to capital and consequently on 
FDI flows, consider first the change in the price of non-traded good induced by labor flows 
  5and in a second step the effect on the reward to capital.  Solve then the system consisting of  
(1.2) and the log differentials of (1.3) and  (1.4)  assuming that only labor endowments 
change and exports and imports prices are exogenous.  This gives the system: 
() ()
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 Solving  (1.6) provides the expression linking the equilibrium domestic price to 
factor endowments.   
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The impact of factor endowment changes on the domestic price is straightforward. 
From (1.7), emigration of labor specific to the non-traded sector raises the relative price of 
the non-traded good while emigration of export-specific labor lowers the relative price of 
the non-traded good. The adjustment mechanism is as follows: a decrease [increase] in the 
relative supply of non-traded labor   increases [decreases] its relative marginal product 
putting upward [downward] pressure on the relative price of the non-traded good. In the 
limit, if the two consumption goods are easily substitutable, the effect of labor emigration 
on the non-traded sector vanishes.  
N L
Substituting  (1.7) into  (1.1) shows that labor emigration affects the reward to 
capital through a familiar direct effect and indirectly via the induced change in the relative 
price of the non-traded good according to the following expression: 
  ( ) () ( )
11 ˆˆ ˆ ˆ    KN N KE E N N N E E RL L L λλ β α α
σ
=+ + − +
Δ+ Ω
ˆ L  
 
  6  with the indirect effect vanishing when goods are perfect substitutes in consumption 
 or the marginal rate of transformation in production is infinite  . 
Rearranging the above expression yields: 
( σ →∞) () Ω→∞
()
() ()
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Emigration of export-specific labor leads to a reduction in the reward to capital, i.e. to FDI 
outflow  ( ) 0 E γ >  while emigration of non-traded sector labor is ambiguous 
. Factor substitutability in production combined 
with low substitutability in consumption leads to an increase in the reward to capital, and 
hence to FDI inflow.  
( 0; 0 NN N γσ σ γσ >⇔ > <⇔< ) N σ
  Add now the effects of a change in trade costs. Differentiating  (1.5)   
ˆˆˆ ˆ MEε μ −=− and substituting  ˆ ˆ M p μ =  and  ˆ ˆ E p ε = , the expression for the change in the 













    
If imports and non-traded goods are sufficiently good substitutes in consumption () , 
then a reduction in import-related costs 
1 σ >
( ) 0 dμ <  which lowers the relative price of 
imports will lead to a decrease in the price of the home good, .  A reduction in export-
related transaction costs (
N p
) 0 dε >  will make export goods more profitable and will always 
increase  , with the effect vanishing when it becomes costless to shift resources across 
sectors, i.e. when   .   
N p
Ω→∞
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  7If the elasticity of substitution between imported and domestic good is less than 1, the 
reduction in trade costs (lower μ  or higherε ) will result in higher price of capital and 
positive FDI.  The effect of a reduction in trade costs on FDI works independently of the 
effects of the composition of emigration.  
  To sum up, the skeleton model is useful to investigate Migration-FDI and Trade-
FDI links. Starting with Migration-FDI links, it indicates that the skill composition of 
migration will have an impact on FDI with the possibility that emigration of non-traded 
labour will have an ambiguous effect on the profitability of FDI with the possibility of a 
complementarity relation. As to the Trade-FDI links, the model results can be linked to the 
literature on market-seeking (HFDI) and efficiency-seeking (VDFI). Take the case of 
HFDI. Then, if imports and domestic substitutes are good substitutes in consumption 
,  an increase in the barriers to imports will attract FDI, as predicted by the HFDI 
literature. Take now the case of VFDI. Then a decrease in trade-related costs will make 
outsourcing more profitable and hence export activities in the home-country with a 
resulting increase in FDI. 
( 1 σ > )
 
 
3. Data and Empirical Specification 
 
Predictions about the pattern of emigration on FDI suggested by the model are 
going to be confronted to data on FDI between 1990 and 2000 for 103 migration sending 
countries.   To explore the links between trade, the skill-composition of migration and 
FDI for migration-sending countries, we dispose of migration rates by level of education 
from Docquier and Marfouk (2006) and two-way (inward and outward) FDI for a 
reasonably large sample of countries since 1990. For our sample of migration sending 
countries, all are net receivers of FDI for both years so we explore the correlates of changes 
in the net inward inflow of FDI over the two years (1990 and 2000) for which data is 
available on the composition of migration.  
The model predicts that changes in FDI should be linked to changes in trade policy, 
the composition of migration and control variables.  The usefulness of the model rests on 
the plausibility of two key assumptions: (i) the disaggregation between skilled and 
unskilled emigration; (ii) the importance of general equilibrium effects when studying the 
impact of emigration on FDI. As a prelude to the econometric estimates that follow, we 
take a look at emigration patterns over the period considered.  
  8 
Figure 1 here 
 
 
Figure 1 displays the data and shows the evolution of migration rates, the 
composition of emigration and the schooling gap (defined here as the ratio of the schooling 
level of emigrants to the average schooling of the population) Four patterns are discernible 
in the data  First, emigration has been mostly of the skilled (the skilled emigration rate is 
higher than the average emigration rate for all group of countries for both years). Second, 
the SG is consistently greater than unity and higher for the low income countries. Third, the 
SG has fallen slightly by 2000. Fourth, there are substantial variations across broad country 





  Dropping the time subscript, let  i X Δ refer to the change in the value of variable X 
for country i between 1990 and 2000 and ( )
* / ii t K Y Δ  represent the flow of net FDI as a 
percent of GDP,  , where t is a subscript usually indicating the beginning of period, 1990. 
As suggested by the model, the change in the labour supply is estimated by the change in 
the stock of emigrants over the 1990-2000 period expressed as a percent of  labour  supply 
(including emigrants) in 1990, i.e. : 
it Y
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ii MIG L s H M L Δ= . To capture the change in 















. The model also suggests that changes in trade 
restrictiveness,  , belongs to the basic specification. The specification is completed by 
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  9  Including an adequate set of controls is a first challenge since the links between 
FDI, migration and trade barriers depend on a host of other factors. To name the most 
important ones, we include a measure of remoteness, a proxy for the skill composition of 
exports, income per capita and its growth rate,  and proxies for the quality of institutions 
and political stability that would influence the return to investment.  
  A second major challenge is reverse causality since the relationship between FDI 
and migration is likely to go both ways.
6 One the one hand, migration influences FDI 
through the change in the return to capital (as our model suggests) or via other channels 
such as migrant networks (not included in the model but controlled for in table 3). On the 
other hand, FDI is also likely to influence migration, and in particular that of skilled labour. 
Higher levels of FDI may increase the demand for skilled labour or increase overall 
income, thereby reducing migration. Or, if financial constraint to migration is binding, 
higher income generated by FDI may lead to higher outflows of workers.  
  We use the stock of migrants in 1980 in the USA and Canada as percentage of 
sending-country population (these are the only two countries with sufficient data for our 
sample). The justification for this choice is that the prior of stock of emigrants is likely to 
meet the exclusion restriction (i.e. to be potentially correlated with migration but not 
directly with FDI).  Arguably, more migrants from developing countries in 1980 in the 
USA and Canada would make the subsequent migration (especially high-skilled labour) 
easier via migrant networks. At the same time, migrants who arrived in the USA and 
Canada before 1980 would be less likely to influence FDI in 1990-2000 period, since they 
are less informed about recent investment opportunities in their home countries.  Indeed, it 
is likely that the longer the migrant has lived abroad, the less likely he would have 
information about current investment opportunities in the source country to convey to 
potential investors. In other words, recent migrants are the most knowledgeable about 
where and how to invest in their home countries. This is especially true for developing 




                                                 
6 Education levels influence both FDI and migration decisions, and past migration has been found to influence 
current FDI through network effects, Checchi et al. (2007)). FDI is also sensitive to the political and economic 
environment of the host country. In turn migration is influenced by the networks between migrants in FDI 
outflow countries and migrant sending countries, Rauch and Trinidade (2002), Rauch and Casella (2003).  
 
  104.2. Sample and Data 
  
  The sample of migration sending countries is chosen by excluding 26 “traditional” 
immigration-receiving countries
7 as well as developed Asian countries - Korea, Malaysia, 
Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan and Thailand
8 from the whole sample of countries covered 
by Docquier and Marfouk (2006).  Given the availability of data for the other variables, this 
gives us a sample of 103 countries. 
  The annex describes data sources in detail. The dependant variable is the net FDI 
inflow constructed from the UNCTAD inward and outward foreign direct investment data. 
Our preferred measure is the average annual net FDI as a percentage of GDP between 1990 
and 2000
9.  As a check on the sensitivity of our results, we also use as a second measure, 
the difference in net FDI stocks (as % of GDP) between 1990 and 2000.  As mentioned 
above, migration data comes from Docquier and Marfouk (2006) and Beine et al. (2007). 
The database contains information on emigration stocks by educational attainment (low, 
medium, high
10) in 1990 and 2000).
11   
  Among the key variables included in the model, we had difficulty obtaining an 
indicator of the change in a country’s trade policy for our large sample with many small 
countries, including islands. We refrained from constructing an index residually from a 
regression estimating trade volumes and opted for the average tariffs in 1996-2000 from the 
World Bank Trade Data Base.
12
                                                 
7 Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, 
Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. 
8 These countries are excluded because of high skill intensity of exports making them less comparable to other 
MSC and being potentially immigration receiving countries. 
9 By taking averages, we are also able to cope with the problem of missing data for countries which became 
independent in the early 1990s (e.g. countries in Central and Eastern Europe).   
10 Using data from Beine et al (2007) we control for the age of entry of high-skilled immigrants (at least 22 
years  of age). This allows excluding emigrants who obtained their education in the country of destination and 
never participated in the labour force of their country of origin.  
11 Restricting the change in labour force to changes in the composition of emigration neglects factors other 
than emigration that affect education levels, such as education policies, and linkages between human capital 
and emigration.  Short of modelling the supply of skills directly as in e.g. Cecchi et al.(2007), we include 
among the controls some of the factors affecting the supply of skills (income per capita and its growth rate). 
Controls also include factors affecting the investment climate like measures of political stability. This said, 
the results in Cecchi et al. suggest the potential for reverse causality since educational decisions are linked to 
past FDI and past migration.     
12  This period is chosen because of close to complete data availability for the sample because for the period 
1990-1995, tariff data is missing for many countries. We also experimented with interpolation to fill missing 
data to measure trade liberalization as (tariff (2000)-tariff (1990)/1+ tariff (1990)). We also computed 10 
years tariff average. Neither was significant. Since  a change in tariffs will have a different incentive on FDI 
according to whether the country is receiving HFDI or VFDI, this is not surprising. 
  11  To sum up, the set of controls include the following. The skill-intensity of exports is 
approximated by the share of machinery and transport equipment (Section 7 of Standard 
International Trade Classification (SITC)) in total exports, a category listed among the most 
skill intensive industries by Romalis (2004) (see his table 1) . The logarithm of GDP at 
constant prices in 1990 and the logarithm of population in 1990 serve as a proxy for the 
effects of wage costs on the nature of FDI. The share of high-skill workers in 1990, which 
is negatively correlated with the skill gap in emigration patterns during 1990-2000 serves as 
a proxy for human capital.  We also include the change in the share of the highly skilled in 
the labour force between 1990 and 2000, a measure of human capital formation related to 
educational policies. Since we also include the change in GDP and population, we have 
essentially a first-difference specification in the main variables of interest, GDP, population 
and the skill-composition in emigration. 
  Two variables are included to proxy for the risk premium and socio-political 
environment: the index of political stability (increasing values corresponding to more 
stability), and an index of linguistic fractionalization (higher values corresponding to higher 
diversity)
13.  
Remoteness is measured by the inverse of the distance-weighted GDP and comes 












 , where  j represent all other countries (except i) and  is the 
distance in km between the capitals of countries iand 
ij D
j . 
  Finally in view of the stylized differences in regional patterns of emigration, we also 
include as controls three regional dummy variables for Persian Gulf countries (Bahrain, 
Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates), small developing islands 
(defined as in Docquier and Marfouk (2006)) and transition economies (Central and Eastern 
European countries, including former Yugoslavian and Soviet Union Republics (altogether 
26 countries)).  
  As to the data source for our instrument – the sum of stocks of migrants in the USA 
and Canada from developing countries in 1980 relative to the home country populations – it 
comes from the official USA and Canada 2000 Population Census statistics. In particular, 
the 2000 Population Censuses of these countries contain (the publically and electronically 
                                                 
13 If population shares of  linguistic groups in a country are  , the index of linguistic 
fractionalization is given by  . 
n n p p p ,..., , 2 1
∑ = − =
n
i i p F
1
2 1
  12available) information on whether the foreign-born (from practically all countries of the 






  Table 1 reports the results with robustness and sensitivity checks reported in tables 
2 and 3. Consider first OLS results . Regardless of the definition of skills, table 1 shows 
that, after taking into account the controls, FDI and a change in the pattern of emigration 
towards skilled labour are positively correlated. Thus, a reduction in the relative supply of 
skilled labour (more emigrants) attracts FDI, i.e. the pattern of observed emigration and 
FDI are complements. Using alternative definitions for the measurement of the skill 
composition of emigration in columns [1] - [3], after taking into account the separate 
influence exerted by the controls, a 1 percentage point decrease in the relative supply of 
skilled labour between 1990 and 2000 has been associated with an increase in annual FDI 
(as a percentage of GDP) of about 0.017-0.019 percentage points. Thus, an increase in 
skilled- labour emigration (net of low-skilled emigration) of e.g. 10 percentage points 
between 1990 and 2000 was associated with an increase in FDI inflows by 0.17-0.19 
percentage points annually(as a share of GDP). The OLS result is significant at 1%.  
  Turning to the IV results (columns [4] – [6] of table 1), the instrument is significant 
at the 1% level in the first stage regression and (depending on the definition of the skill 
composition), explains 23-36% of the variation of the migration variable. The Cragg-
Donald F-statistic is sufficiently high (ranging from 26.6 to 37.9), confirming that the 
coefficient of the instrument in the first stage regression is different from 0.  As to the IV 
results, for all the specifications, migration coefficient values increase to 0.022-0.032 and 
remain highly significant.   
 
Table 1 here: Correlates of FDI in Migration-sending Countries 
 
                                                 
14  Migrants who arrived to the USA or Canada before 1980, but died between 1980 and 2000 cannot be 
accounted for, since we can use only 2000 Census data.  Census data for 1980 and 1990 are either 
unavailable or extremely limited and in all cases not sufficiently disaggregated by country of origin.   In our 
sample, stocks of migrants in the USA and Canada are highly correlated (ρ = 0.69 ) so that results are 
unaffected if as instrument the stock in either country rather than the sum of stocks.  
  
  13  Comfortingly, most of the controls have the expected signs and several are 
significant. The negative partial correlation between GDP (controlling for population) and 
FDI inflows conforms with predictions.  Note, however, that this correlation would also be 
consistent with another interpretation if income per capita is a proxy for differences in 
factor endowments. Then, low income-per-capita countries would, as suggested by the 
neoclassical growth model, attract VFDI. As in Cecchi et al., the education level is 
positively correlated with FDI, significantly so when we use the difference measure of FDI 
in col. [1] and [2] of table 2. At the same time, the impact of the relative change in the share 
of the high-skilled workers affects FDI flows negatively and significantly so.  
  Average 1996-2000 tariffs are negatively correlated with net FDI inflows as would 
be expected if FDI is of the VFDI type since higher trade costs reduce the incentives for 
efficiency-seeking (as opposed to market-seeking) FDI. Note also that the inclusion or 
exclusion of the tariff variable does not affect the sign and significance of the coefficient of 
the migration variable (both in OLS and IV). However, given that the average tariffs do not 
measure the changes in trade policy over the period, it is difficult to put much significance 
on this result.  
  Country size is negatively correlated with FDI flows but the coefficient is not 
significant.  Neither is remoteness a significant correlate of FDI inflows over the period. 
Among the dummies, the dummy for island economies is significant at 10%, probably 
reflecting tourism-related FDI.   
  The sign of the coefficient associated with the linguistic variable is interesting. 
Linguistic fractionalisation is negatively associated with FDI inflows. This result is in line 
with previous evidence indicating an adverse impact of linguistic and ethnic heterogeneity 
on various social and economic variables, e.g. the provision of public goods, the literacy 
rate, the extent of corruption and political freedom, the incidence of civil wars, and growth 
(see  e.g. Easterly and Levine (1997), La Porta et al. (1999), Alesina et al. (2003), Montalvo 
and Reynal-Querol (2005a, 2005b)).  
  The OLS result is robust to a different measure of FDI when we use the difference 
in stocks of net FDI (as % of GDP) between 2000 and 1990 as dependent variable (col. [1] 
and [2] in table 2) . Again, we find that a more than proportional outflow of high-skill 
labour between 1990 and 2000 is associated with a positive change in FDI stock. 
Specifically, a 10 percentage point increase in relatively high skilled emigration in 1990-
2000 is associated with 1.2 (OLS) – 2.2 (IV) percentage point increase of FDI stock (as % 
of GDP).  
  14 
Table 2 here: Correlates of FDI: Robustness and Sensitivity Checks 
 
  Results are also robust to a change in sample when transition economies (col. [3] 
and [4] of table 2) and small developing island economies (col. [5] and [6]) are excluded.  
Using OLS, we still obtain a significant and positive coefficient of relatively high-skilled 
emigration. However, excluding small island economies reduces by half the value of the 
coefficient. Using 1980 migrant stock in the USA and Canada as an instrument, there is no 
change in results when transition economies are excluded, but we notice that these 
instruments are no longer valid if small islands are excluded from our sample.
15  
  In spite of the included controls and the above robustness checks, this apparently 
robust correlation might be spurious as it might reflect some omitted variable affecting both 
FDI and emigration. Among the more important possibilities, changes in immigration 
policies in host countries might have fostered diasporas which in turn could have 
contributed to changes in the perception about the attractiveness of FDI, or to changes in 
FDI policies in migration-sending countries. To see if this diaspora channel might be 
important, we purge from the data an estimate of FDI-related networks. 
  To control for the importance of networks (see Docquier and Lodigiani (2007)), we 
use data by Docquier, Lowell and Marfouk (2007) to build migration data by country of 
destination. In a first step we find the three main migrant destinations for all sending 
countries, which for most countries in our sample account for close to 90% of migrants. In 
a second step, we calculate for each sending country the percentage of the stock of FDI that 
comes from the three main destinations of migrants (we find the major origins of FDI in the 
UNCTAD country profiles, although sometimes only flow data for certain years (e.g. 2000) 
are available).  We then subtract the share of FDI coming from the migrant destination 
countries from the aggregate FDI value to isolate “networks-related FDI” from total FDI 
inflows. As a result of this construction of bilateral migration and FDI, we lose 40 % of 
observations.  
 
Table 3 here: Estimates Excluding Diaspora-related FDI 
                                                 
15 Given the significance of the dummy variable for small islands, this confirms the fact that small islands are 
important and different as evident from the patterns in figure 1. Clearly other instruments would be desirable 
for a restricted sample of developing countries that would exclude small islands, though there is no a priori 
reason to exclude small islands, especially in an otherwise small cross-section sample. 
 
  15 
The results from this new set of estimates are reported in table 3 are still broadly 
supportive of the complementarity results reported in tables 1 and 2. Not surprisingly, with 
this smaller sample, estimates are less precise, although the signs of the control variables 
remain the same. If the dependent variable is the average annual FDI (col. [1]), the 
migration (high-skilled less low-skilled) variable is positive, but insignificant. However, if 
the dependent variable is the difference in the stock of FDI (col. [3]), the migration 
variable is positive and significant at the 1% level.  With IV estimates (see cols. (2) and 
(4)), the value of the migration coefficient increases with greater statistical significance 
when the difference in the FDI stocks is used as dependent variable rather than average 
annual FDI growth.  
 
5. Summary   
 
  This paper investigated the channels linking FDI, migration and trade for migration-
sending countries in a unified framework suitable for empirical investigation with macro 
data. Assuming that (horizontal) FDI responds to changes in the reward to capital, we 
investigate the effects of changes in the skill composition of the labour force through 
migration (emigration is assumed exogenous and determined by immigration policies in 
host countries) on FDI. If exports in migration sending countries are relatively less skill 
intensive than non-traded goods, a skewed pattern of emigration towards skilled labour 
which raises the price of the non-traded good will also raise the net capital reward, thereby 
leading to positive FDI. In this set-up, emigration of skilled labour is complementary with 
FDI whereas in the standard specific-factor trade-theoretic models trade and factor 
movements are substitutes as the outflow of one factor of production (here aggregate or 
skilled labour) raises the return to the remaining factor (capital) inducing its inflow. In the 
skeleton model developed here, with a non-traded sector and different skill-intensities 
between the non-traded good and exports, the substitutability proposition can be reversed if 
the non-traded sector is relatively skill-abundant. While non-traded sectors are usually 
assumed to be low-skill intensive, recent migration patterns suggest that this may not 
always be the case (see e.g. Bhargava and Docquier (2008)).  
  Correlations on a sample of 103 developing countries using emigration rates by skill 
for 1990 and 2000 support this conjecture. Over 1990-2000, the conditional correlation 
between FDI flows and the pattern of emigration suggests that, after controlling for 
  16countries’ GDP per capita, education level and other factors, an increase in the emigration 
rate of high-skilled workers (net of low-skilled emigration) by 10 percentage points is 
associated with an increase in annual FDI (as a share of GDP) of about 0.2 percentage 
points.  
  The complementarity between skilled emigration and FDI is generally robust 
notably to different measures of FDI and to different samples (i.e. excluding transition 
economies or small islands). The correlation suggesting complementarity is also fairly 
robust to an alternative estimation on a smaller sample in which diaspora-related FDI has 
been purged. Taken together, the results are supportive of studying the migration-trade-FDI 
nexus in a general equilibrium setting taking into account the skill composition of 
emigrants. 
  The results also extend the channels through which linguistic fractionalization 
diversity affect developing-country performance. Whereas previous channels emphasized 
growth and corruption, we find here that linguistic fractionalization is negatively correlated 
with FDI inflows.  
  17Tables and Figures 
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Source: Adapted from Docquier, Lohest and Marfouk (2007, table 1) 
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Table 1. Correlates of FDI in migration sending countries.   
 
  Dependent variable: 
Average annual FDI (as % of GDP) between 1990 and 2000 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 OLS  OLS  OLS  IV  IV  IV 
0.018***    0.026***     ΔLH/LH(1990) -  ΔLL/LL(1990),  
in %(.)  (0.004)    (0.006)    
 0.017***    0.022***   ΔLH/LH(1990) + ΔLM/LM(1990) -  
ΔLL/LL(1990) , in %(.)   (0.003)    (0.005)  
   0.019***     0.032***  ΔLH/LH(1990) – ΔLM/LM(1990) -  
ΔLL/LL(1990) , in %(.)     (0.004)    (0.008) 
Remoteness   0.614  1.525  -0.543 2.078 2.858 0.937 
  (5.329) (5.346) (5.341) (5.121) (5.092) (5.264) 
-0.069** -0.065* -0.075** -0.059*  -0.056*  -0.062*  Average tariffs, 1996-2000, in % 
(0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.032) (0.032) (0.034) 
Skill intensive exports, in %  0.034  0.035  0.033  0.036  0.036  0.035 
  (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.023) (0.023) (0.024) 
-0.730** -0.738** -0.722** -0.697**  -0.718***  -0.666**  Ln (GDP), 1990 
(0.291) (0.290) (0.293) (0.275) (0.271) (0.287) 
0.005 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.004  GDP growth, 1990-2000,  
in %  (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) 
0.010 0.011 0.009 0.014 0.014 0.013  Share of high-skilled, 1990, in % 
(0.065) (0.065) (0.066) (0.062) (0.061) (0.064) 
-0.016*** -0.015*** -0.017*** -0.021*** -0.018*** -0.025***  Change in the share of high-skilled, 
1990, in %  (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.007) 
0.352 0.389 0.309 0.357 0.404 0.288  Ln (Population), 1990  (0.313) (0.313) (0.316) (0.296) (0.292) (0.308) 
-0.053**  -0.051*  -0.057** -0.054** -0.050** -0.059**  Population growth, 
1990-2000, in %  (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.024) (0.024) (0.025) 
-0.711* -0.660*  -0.767**  -0.749**  -0.671*  -0.863**  Political stability, 1996 
(0.378) (0.377) (0.381) (0.357) (0.351) (0.375) 
-2.327** -2.294** -2.355**  -2.455***  -2.375***  -2.572***  Linguistic fractionalisation, 2001 
(0.904) (0.902) (0.910) (0.858) (0.843) (0.895) 
0.165 0.391 -0.094 0.151 0.452 -0.289  Transition economies 
(1.226) (1.225) (1.236) (1.158) (1.143) (1.208) 
1.065 1.280 0.812 1.159 1.414 0.787  Persian Gulf 
(1.290) (1.290) (1.298) (1.219) (1.207) (1.264) 
1.885* 1.829 2.015* 1.021  1.192  0.770  Islands 
(1.105) (1.106) (1.106) (1.185) (1.146) (1.268) 
15.672*** 14.841*** 16.715*** 14.515*** 13.752*** 15.631***  Constant 
(4.178) (4.195) (4.185) (4.017) (4.003) (4.119) 
    18.841***  22.388***  15.295***  Instrument
a :    coeff. 1
st stage 
standard error      (3.061)  (3.205)  (2.963) 
Partial R
2  of excl. instrument        0.30  0.36  0.23 
Cragg-Donald F-stat 
(p-value) 






Number  of  observations  103 103 103 103 103 103 
R
2 0.548 0.550 0.542 0.523 0.537 0.485 
 
Standard errors in parenthesis  
a Stock of migrants in the USA and Canada in 1980  as % of sending country population. 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
ΔLi/Li , i = high, medium, low, is the change in emigration stock of labor with skill level i between 1990 and 2000 
(positive, if emigration stock increased) with respect to total labor force with skill level i in 1990, expressed in %.  
 
Skill-intensive exports is a share of machinery and transport equipment (SITC7) in total exports.  
 
Political stability index ranges from -2.5 to 2.5. Higher values correspond to better governance outcomes.  
 
Linguistic fractionalization index ranges from 0 to 1. Higher values correspond to higher linguistic and religious diversity.  
 
  19Persian Gulf dummy equals 1 for Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates, otherwise 0. 
Transition dummy equals 1 for countries of the former socialist block, including ex-Yugoslavia, otherwise 0.  
 
Islands dummy equals 1 for the Bahamas, Comoros, Fiji, Guyana, Jamaica, Mauritius, Papua New Guinea, Saint Lucia, 
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Sao Tome and Principe, Trinidad and Tobago  
 
  20Table 2. Correlates of FDI: Robustness and sensitivity checks. 
 
Average annual FDI (as % of GDP)  
between 1990 and 2000  Dependent variable Î 
Stock of FDI (% of GDP) in 
2000  




Without small island 
economies 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
 OLS  IV  OLS  IV  OLS  IV 
0.120*** 0.216***  0.018***  0.025***  0.009**  0.027  ΔLH/LH(1990) -  ΔLL/LL(1990), in %(.) 
(0.031) (0.054)  (0.004)  (0.006)  (0.005)  (0.034) 
-22.907 -5.276 -1.240 0.140 3.857 2.864  Remoteness  
(45.596) (44.929) (5.533) (5.233) (5.060) (5.404) 
-0.490* -0.363 -0.057  -0.048  -0.034  -0.038  Average tariffs, 1996-2000, in % 
(0.288) (0.285)  (0.035)  (0.033)  (0.033)  (0.033) 
0.248 0.272  0.046  0.046*  0.034  0.032  Skill intensive exports, in % 
(0.207) (0.200)  (0.030)  (0.027)  (0.022)  (0.022) 
-7.325*** -6.931*** -0.625* -0.601**  -0.794***  -0.757***  Ln (GDP), 1990 
(2.488) (2.416)  (0.325)  (0.302)  (0.284)  (0.292) 
-0.006 -0.017 0.007  0.006  0.002  0.001  GDP growth, 1990-2000, in % 
(0.067) (0.065)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.007)  (0.007) 
0.953* 0.992*  -0.008  -0.001  0.042 0.029  Share of high-skilled, 1990, in % 
(0.558) (0.540)  (0.084)  (0.078)  (0.058)  (0.063) 
-0.129*** -0.183***  -0.016***  -0.020*** -0.007  -0.019  Change in the share of high-skilled, 
1990, in %  (0.045) (0.050)  (0.005)  (0.006)  (0.005)  (0.023) 
4.203 4.267  0.264  0.279  0.507*  0.524*  Ln (Population), 1990 
(2.681) (2.596)  (0.345)  (0.320)  (0.291)  (0.292) 
-0.622*** -0.627*** -0.062** -0.062**  -0.022  -0.046  Population growth, 1990-2000, in 
%  (0.222) (0.215)  (0.030)  (0.027)  (0.025)  (0.052) 
-6.164* -6.626**  -0.696*  -0.736**  -0.294 -0.480  Political stability, 1996  (3.230) (3.135)  (0.398)  (0.370)  (0.352)  (0.499) 
-6.222 -7.770  -2.087**  -2.197**  -2.275***  -2.663**  Linguistic fractionalisation, 2001 
(7.734) (7.524)  (1.015)  (0.943)  (0.826)  (1.110) 
-16.657 -16.820*      1.296  0.381  Transition economies 
(10.491) (10.156)      (1.154) (2.094) 
5.970 7.100  1.060  1.146  1.649  1.560  Persian Gulf 
(11.036) (10.697) (1.310) (1.214) (1.167) (1.179) 
8.139 -2.269  1.738  1.057      Islands 
(9.450) (10.399)  (1.171)  (1.207)     
137.219*** 123.287*** 14.889*** 13.784*** 12.434*** 12.651***  Constant 
(35.750) (35.237) (4.718) (4.450) (3.925) (3.947) 
 18.841***    19.086***    4.807  Instrument
a :   coeff. 1
st stage 
standard error   (3.061)   (3.528)    (4.049) 
Partial R









Number of observations  103  103  82  82  92  92 
R
2 0.424 0.361  0.581  0.561  0.365  0.242 
 
Standard errors in parenthesis  
a Stock of migrants in the USA and Canada in 1980  as % of sending country population. 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 











  21Table 3.    IV Estimates Excluding Diaspora-related FDI 
 
Average annual FDI ( % of GDP)  
between 1990 and 2000, 
Stock of FDI (% of GDP) in 2000- 
stock of FDI (% of GDP) in 1990,  Dependent variable Î 
excluding FDI from three major migrant destinations 
  OLS IV OLS IV 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
0.008 0.013*  0.094***  0.102**  ΔLH/LH(1990) -  ΔLL/LL(1990), in %(.) 
(0.005) (0.007) (0.034) (0.049) 
3.937 3.603  21.568  20.990  Remoteness  
(5.829) (5.124)  (38.753)  (33.783) 
-0.050 -0.044 -0.404 -0.392  Average tariffs, 1996-2000, in % 
(0.044) (0.040) (0.295) (0.262) 
0.009 0.010 0.132 0.133  Skill intensive exports, in % 
(0.023) (0.020) (0.153) (0.133) 
-0.550* -0.507*  -5.753***  -5.679***  Ln (GDP), 1990 
(0.306) (0.273) (2.034) (1.801) 
-0.002 -0.004 -0.094  -0.098*  GDP growth, 1990-2000, in % 
(0.009) (0.008) (0.058) (0.053) 
-0.025 -0.013 0.461  0.483  Share of high-skilled, 1990, in % 
(0.072) (0.065) (0.479) (0.428) 
-0.002 -0.003 -0.017 -0.019  Change in the share of high-skilled, 
1990, in %  (0.007) (0.006) (0.046) (0.041) 
0.223 0.196  4.053*  4.006**  Ln (Population), 1990 
(0.340) (0.300) (2.260) (1.976) 
-0.046 -0.035 -0.309 -0.290  Population growth, 1990-2000, in 
%  (0.045) (0.042) (0.301) (0.276) 
-0.368 -0.292 -2.079 -1.947  Political stability, 1996  (0.484) (0.434) (3.216) (2.863) 
-2.112** -2.132**  -5.045  -5.079  Linguistic fractionalisation, 2001 
(1.025) (0.898) (6.814) (5.923) 
1.038 1.047 -2.217  -2.202  Transition economies 
(1.392) (1.219) (9.252) (8.039) 
2.078 1.318 4.494 3.179  Island  (1.546) (1.649)  (10.280)  (10.870) 
12.048** 11.222** 84.650**  83.220***  Constant 
(5.306)  (4.760)  (35.275)  (31.382) 
Instrument
a :         coeff. 1
st stage    14.548***  14.548*** 
standard error   (2.768)  (2.768) 
Partial R







Number  of  observations  61 61 61 61 
R
2 0.551 0.543 0.552 0.551 
 
Standard errors in parenthesis  
a Stock of migrants in the USA and Canada in 1980  as % of sending country population. 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 










  22Appendix  
 
Table A1: Data Sources and Definitions 
 
Name of 
Variable  Definition    Source 
    
FDI: ()
* / it it K Y Δ   Net FDI as % of GDP   UNCTAD data base 
GDP  GDP in 1990  WDI indicators 
Population Population  in 1990   WDI indicators 
Share of high-
skilled, 1990  Share of high skill in the labor force  Docquier and Marfouk (2006) 
Remoteness   Inverse of distance-weighted GDP  A. Rose database 
Average tariffs  Average tariffs in 1996-2000  Ng database 
Skill intensive 
exports 
Machinery and transport /total exports  SITC, section 7 
Political 
stability, 1996 
Political stability -2.5 (less 
stable)<PSi+2.5 ( more stable) 





Linguistic fractionalization  
 [0 (low diversity) … 1 ( high 
diversity)] 




Table A2. Summary statistics. 
 
Variable Observ.  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
average annual FDI (as % of GDP), 1990-
2000  103 2.49 2.88 -5.25  14.72 
stock of FDI  (% of GDP) in 2000 - 
stock of FDI  (% of GDP) in 1990  103 16.30  21.83 -48.34  124.85 
ΔLH/LH(1990) -  ΔLL/LL(1990) 103 28.00  75.02 -5.23  489.06 
ΔLH/LH(1990) +ΔLM/LM(1990) -  ΔLL/LL(1990) 103 34.30  82.33 -6.75  504.77 
ΔLH/LH(1990) - ΔLM/LM(1990) -  ΔLL/LL(1990) 103 21.69  68.75 -27.86  473.35 
Remoteness 103  0.18  0.06  0.07  0.33 
Average tariffs, 1996-2000, in %  103  15.50  8.14  0.24  38.13 
Skill intensive exports, in % 103  8.92  12.63 0.04  59.64 
Ln (GDP), 1990  103  22.83  1.83  17.47  26.86 
GDP growth, 1990-2000, in %  103  31.37  40.18  -64.39  180.15 
Share of high-skilled, 1990, in %  103  6.93 6.07  0.10 20.10 
Change in the share of high-skilled, 1990, 
in %  103 44.50  52.00 -10.00  300.00 
Ln (Population), 1990  103  15.81  1.74  11.60  20.85 
Population growth, 1990-2000, in %  103  18.57  14.63  -13.55  53.22 
Political stability, 1996  103 -0.28 0.81 -2.92  0.98 
Linguistic fractionalisation, 2001  103  0.40  0.29  0.01  0.92 
Transition economies  103  0.20  0.40  0  1 
Persian Gulf  103  0.04  0.19  0  1 
Islands 103  0.11  0.31  0  1 
  23Stock of migrants in the USA and Canada 
in 1980  as % of sending country pop.  103 0.91 2.39  0 12.34 
Average annual FDI ( % of GDP)  
between 1990 and 2000, 
excluding FDI from three major migrant 
destinations 
61 1.97  2.22 -2.65  10.15 
Stock of FDI (% of GDP) in 2000- stock 
of FDI (% of GDP) in 1990,  excluding 
FDI from three major migrant destinations
61 12.76  14.75  -15.20  66.28 
 
 
Table A3. Correlation Matrix between independent variables. 
 





exports  Ln(GDP)  GDP  
growth 
Migration 
ΔLH/LH(1990) -  ΔLL/LL(1990)
1.00          
Remoteness 0.10  1.00         
Average tariffs  0.08  0.22  1.00       
Skill intensive exports  -0.11  -0.42  -0.27  1.00     
Ln (GDP), 1990  -0.38  -0.21  -0.16  0.39  1.00   
GDP growth  0.09  0.29  0.22  -0.04  -0.03  1.00 
Share of high-skilled  -0.27  -0.47  -0.50  0.30  0.34  -0.47 
Change in the share of high-
skilled  0.41 0.22  0.17  -0.20  -0.19  0.18 
Ln (Population)  -0.34  -0.02  0.06  0.13  0.78  0.11 
Population growth  0.03  0.48  0.29  -0.39  -0.26  0.55 
Political stability  0.15  -0.07  -0.18  0.29  -0.30  0.00 
Linguistic fractionalisation  0.01 0.26  0.11  -0.31  -0.17  -0.01 
Transition economies  -0.17  -0.63  -0.44  0.43  0.21  -0.63 
Persian Gulf  -0.07  -0.05 -0.19  -0.10  0.11  0.07 
Islands 0.47  0.23  0.30  -0.09  -0.41  0.03 
 
















econ.  Gulf 
Share  of  high-skilled  1.00         
Change in the share 
of high-skilled  -0.46  1.00        
Ln  (Population)  -0.03  0.02  1.00       
Population  growth  -0.57  0.23  0.01  1.00      
Political stability  0.18  -0.26  -0.54  -0.27  1.00       
Linguistic 
fractionalisation  -0.34 0.16 0.13 0.31 -0.24 1.00     
Transition  economies  0.69 -0.38 0.01 -0.73 0.21 -0.12 1.00   
Persian Gulf  0.14  -0.09  -0.13 0.08 0.02 -0.06 -0.10 1.00 
Islands -0.24  0.06  -0.52  -0.11 0.35 -0.21 -0.18 -0.07 
 
Note: see table A1 for definition of variables 
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